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Abstract: Although collaboration between partners is now considered as a mean to increase the performance of the supply 
chains, most of them are still managed in a directive way through cascades of classical MRP/MRP2 systems, in which the 
constraints of the suppliers, especially the smallest ones, are poorly taken into account. We suggest in this article to assess the 
interest of the integration into collaborative processes of some practices based on MRP, identified after a study in aeronautical 
supply chains. Within these processes, classical parameters of MRP would be negotiated instead of being imposed by the 
large companies.
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1. Introduction
Recent studies on Supply Chain Management 
consider that information sharing, joint-planning, 
cooperation and strategic partnerships over the 
entire supply chain are conditions for building more 
efficient and reactive supply chains (see for instance 
(Sahin and Powell Robinson, 2005)). Nevertheless, 
large industrial supply chains, like in the automotive 
or aeronautical sectors, still use classical production 
management methods, and especially MRP2 
(Manufacturing Resource Planning), as the 
backbone of the exchanges between suppliers and 
customers (Van Donselaar et al., 2000). When, as 
often, customers have more power on their suppliers 
than the opposite, the suppliers, especially if they are 
small companies, may be reluctant to express their 
local constraints to their customers. This difficulty 
is still increased when these constraints are poorly 
consistent with Supply Chain Management and Lean 
Manufacturing principles, now intensively promoted 
by large companies. The risk is then that these 
constraints turn into hidden practices, which may 
decrease the performance of the supply chain.
This article first aims at identifying such practices 
through interviews in companies of the aeronautic 
sector (section 2), then at “publishing” these 
constraints and including them in negotiation 
processes, even if the negotiation on the considered 
items may be considered as incompatible with 
nowadays habits (section 3). 
Our purpose is to show that including some 
parameters of MRP into a negotiation process could 
lead in some cases to a “win-win” situation which 
could benefit to all the supply chain.
2. Analysis of real practices in the 
aeronautic sector 
2.1. The context of aeronautical supply chains 
The aeronautical industry has an oligopolistic market 
structure characterized by high technological, 
financial and market entry barriers (Tyson, 1992). To 
lower these barriers, the aircraft firms implement a 
production organization characterized by a pyramid-
shaped hierarchic structure (convergent network) 
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with an assembly area at the top where the parts and 
components coming from three main sub-sectors 
(engines, equipment and avionics, and airframe) are 
assembled for obtaining the final product (Esposito 
and Passaro, 2009). 
Three main production levels may be distinguished: 
at the first level, the leader firm, which directly 
operates in the airframe sub-sector, organizes the 
flow of parts, components, systems and information 
and coordinates the program and assembly of the 
final product. The firms of the second production 
level manufacture complex parts and components of 
the aircraft both for the sub-systems manufacturers 
and for the assembler (fuselage, wings, motors, land 
gears etc.). Generally, these large firms are leaders 
in their own program, and belong at the same time 
to the first and second level. The third production 
level includes Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME), subcontracting firms who generally 
work for the second production level. From the 
second level firms, they receive the information 
on the production process, the manufacturing 
specifications, the technical service etc. When the 
manufacturing process is over, they transfer the 
ordered components and relevant information to the 
second-level customers. The suppliers in this level 
are approved by the leader firm, which checks if 
they are able to meet the quality standards required 
and if the production process is realized according 
to the procedures imposed in the program. In the 
last few years, suppliers have become increasingly 
involved in the production of parts with high added 
value, including the management of their upstream 
suppliers, but have also been invited to share the risks 
of the programs with the aircraft designer (Esposito 
and Passaro, 2009).
A major difference netween this sector and the 
automotive industry is the higher diversity of the 
parts, aircrafts being produced in small series, but 
containing much more different parts (up to 1 million 
parts for a large aircraft), with long cycle times. 
This results in three important constraints: 
 - Long term planning. Since the aircraft production 
cycle is much longer than for other products, it 
requires the involved partners (subcontractor, 
supplier) to have long terms procurement, 
manufacturing and transportation plans, including 
to monitor changes during a long period. 
 - High flexibility production. Manufacturing an 
aircraft is not a mass production process; each 
component is possibly different depending on the 
type of aircraft. This requires a high flexibility 
and reactivity of each supply network member 
when performing his production processes. 
 -  Efficient relationship. As an industry dealing with 
many diverse and expensive parts, inventories are 
to be kept at the minimum level while ensuring 
a good availability of each component, shortage 
having tremendous consequences. Thereby, 
the storage and delivery of raw materials, 
components, semi-finished products and sub-
systems should be optimized, which highly 
depends on the coordination between supply 
network members.
Within aeronautical supply chains, the presence of 
many SMEs leads to specific advantages, but also 
to some constraints. Leaders of SMEs are usually 
very receptive to technological constraints but 
the planning process may be informal. Managers 
and operatives are more likely to be directly 
involved with the customers, two ways and face-
to-face communication being the norm in SMEs 
(Ghobadian and Gallear, 1996). As a consequence, 
research shows that SMEs are more responsive to 
market needs, more adaptable to change, and more 
innovative in their ability to meet the customers’ 
demand, but less oriented on information technology 
and management tools allowing long/middle term 
visibility (Appiah-Adu and Singh, 1998; Quayle, 
2003). The traditional approaches and methodologies 
promoted by large companies (Lean Manufacturing, 
MRP...) are therefore considered by some authors 
as not suitable for SMEs, supposed to prefer logical 
reasoning approaches over systematic planning 
approaches, like aggregate production plans or 
production forecasts (Thakkar et al., 2008).
2.2. Supply Chain Management in 
aeronautical Supply Chains 
Supply chains (more exactly “supply networks”, 
their structure being never linear) can be managed 
using two main techniques: centralized, or 
decentralized planning. Centralized planning can 
be performed using an APS (Advanced Planning 
System, (Stadtler and Kilger, 2007)), able to provide 
an optimal planning for all the members of a supply 
chain. In practice, this results in a poor autonomy of 
each company, which would be dedicated to a given 
supply chain, which is not the case in the aeronautical 
industry. On the other hand, decentralized planning 
can be performed using a point-to-point relationship, 
each partner receiving demands from his customers, 
that he translates into a supply plan for his own 
suppliers. This can be done using the MRP2 method 
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(Manufacturing Resource Planning) (see for instance 
(Adams and Cox, 1985)), which is the base of the 
production management modules of all the ERP 
(Enterprise Resource Planning) systems. Using 
MRP2, and for each partner of the supply chain, 
forecasts should be used as inputs for building a 
Sales and Operation Plan (SOP) with a 1-3 years 
horizon in the aeronautical sector (see Figure 1). 
A Master Production Schedule (MPS) can then be 
deduced at lower term. On the base of the obtained 
sequenced requirements on the final products, the 
bills of materials are used for generating on one side a 
Supply Plan, and on the other side a Production Plan 
(Material Requirement Planning step). The adequacy 
between the load generated by the Production Plan 
and the capacity of the company is checked (Load 
Planning), then the production is scheduled, with a 
typical horizon of 1-2 weeks.
Since adaptations of the initial production program 
may be necessary in order to react to unexpected 
events, the forecasts usually contain three zones: firm 
period, corresponding to confirmed orders (typically: 
1 to 2 months); flexible period (typically: 3-6 
months), in which the orders may vary within given 
ratios, e.g. +/-20%, and “free” period, only given 
for information. The total horizon of the forecasts is 
usually 2-3 years, in order to allow the suppliers to 
anticipate large variations of the demand.
Therefore, Supply Chain management is supposed 
to be implemented in this sector through a cascade 
of MRP systems, one in each company (see Figure 
1), the supply plan of each company being used 
to create the forecasts sent to the suppliers. It is 
therefore mandatory that each partner uses consistent 
methods, and is able to efficiently perform his local 
role for propagating information upstream the supply 
chain. As a consequence, it is usually considered that 
SMEs should switch from simple financial plans to 
forecast based planning (Thakkar et al., 2008). In 
that purpose, the use of ERP systems including MRP 
modules, is more and more considered as a condition 
for SMEs to join Supply chains (Lenny Koh and 
Simpson, 2005). We shall see in next section that the 
use of these systems may in some cases be difficult.
3. From local practices to negotiation 
processes
3.1. Emergence of local practices in supply 
chains
During three projects launched by large companies 
aiming at analyzing the product flow in their supply 
chains (Ming, 2011), interviews have been performed 
in several tenths of both large and small companies. 
They showed that many local practices were added 
to the global process described in Figure 1 in order 
to cope with local objectives or constraints of the 
supply chain members. The performed analysis has 
mainly concerned four major operational processes: 
the answer to a “Request for Quotation”, having for 
result the creation of a middle/long term relationship 
between customer and supplier; the middle term 
order management; the orders fulfillment (short 
term) and the supplier development, through audit 
and transfer of various tools and techniques, among 
which MRP and Lean Manufacturing (this point will 
not be detailed here). Some findings of the study are 
summarized hereafter. In each case, we have tried 
to distinguish (even if it may be ambiguous in some 
cases), cooperative practices, i.e. practices aiming at 
helping the partner, from selfish practices, aiming at 
preserving local interests.
Customer’s side/Cooperative practices:
Attempts for protecting the small suppliers from 
variations of the demand have been noticed from 
several large companies, who try for instance, to 
smooth the demand between two periods when 
sending a supply plan to their small suppliers. Others 
try to increase the lot sizes of their commands in 
order to help their suppliers.
Some companies also noticed that sending precise 
due dates for all their orders was not always justified, 
since safety inventories were available for some 
parts. As a consequence, they decided to mention 
their level of inventory with each order, in order to 
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  Figure 1. Supply chain management as a cascade of MRP 
systems (Grabot and Mayère, 2009)
allow their suppliers to assess themselves the criticity 
of the respect of the due date.
Customer’s side/Selfish practices:
Most of the large companies admit that they choose 
suppliers for which they represent an important sale 
ratio (in order to have power over them), but not too 
much (in order to avoid any responsibility if they 
decide to decrease their orders).
Partnerships are usually signed for several years, 
all the contracts including a decrease of the price 
through time (up to 8% per year). The service ratio 
(percentage of parts delivered on time on a given 
period, often the month) is a very important indicator. 
When their ratio is not good, many companies turn 
the status of their order to “urgent” (which has a 
specific significance in the aeronautical industry) 
in order to be sure to be delivered on time, with 
the result of the destabilization of small suppliers 
having to cope with up to 30% of urgent parts. The 
Supply Network defines a “PERT-like” structure 
converging on the assembly of an aircraft, in which 
not all the orders (and suppliers) are on the critical 
path. Therefore, meeting the due dates does not have 
the same importance for all the parts and suppliers. 
Nevertheless, the logisticians, each of them 
managing a group of suppliers at the customer’s, 
do not always know what are the “real” urgencies; 
therefore, they have no other choice than setting the 
same pressure on all the suppliers for all the parts, 
which may destabilize them in overloaded situations.
Supplier’s side/Cooperative practices:
Even if the production program of each aircraft is 
relatively well known and stable, many hazards may 
occur during the manufacturing cycle, with the result 
of urgencies, or even changes in the definition of the 
parts. All the suppliers are used to these constraints, 
and do their best for dealing with them, even if it 
may be costly.
The scarcity of some raw materials (e.g. some 
aeronautical alloys and casted parts) has considerably 
increased the supply times in the recent years; some 
suppliers have now to order raw materials before the 
corresponding orders are confirmed... In that case, 
they take an important financial risk, to the benefit of 
the supply chain.
Supplier’s side/Selfish practices:
Each supplier has “important” customers (usually 
those who generate a high cash flow) and less 
important ones. Therefore, when their capacity is 
insufficient, they privilege their important customers. 
Nevertheless, it is not rare that all the customers work 
for the same final assembler. In that case, the supply 
chain is in a way “competing against itself”, not 
always for its final benefit since the most important 
customer for a local supplier is not necessarily the 
critical one for the supply chain.
Some suppliers having a critical competence (for 
instance surface treatment, which is object of strict 
regulations and is therefore a scarce resource) may 
use this power for imposing to their customers a link 
between price and cycle time, which can hardly be 
taken into account in the classical MRP framework.
In many cases, having to decrease their prices through 
time leads the suppliers to questionable solutions. 
Many of them try for instance to increase their 
lot sizes, by grouping the demand on parts having 
similar characteristics. The result can sometimes be 
both early parts (creating inventories), and late ones. 
These examples show a complex and sometimes 
paradoxical situation, were real attempts to help 
the partner cohabit with selfish behaviors, that 
often remain hidden. The usual way to address this 
problem is to promote standardized “best practices” 
supposed to improve the global performance of the 
supply chain to the final benefit of each partner. 
Nevertheless, some authors have shown that if 
the appropriate mechanisms are not in place, the 
supplier may not perceive the benefits associated 
with these investments and may reject the initiative 
to modify or improve their processes (Krause et al. 
1998). For others, difficulties in developing “state 
of the art” capabilities in Management, technology 
or co-operation is inherent to relationships between 
large and small companies (Chen and Chen, 2002; 
Blomqvist, 2002).
In order to cope with this problem, a different 
research paradigm may be chosen. All behaviors 
have a justification for the companies adopting 
them, even if they can be considered as “positive” 
or “negative” according to usual criteria. Whatever 
their consequence can be, and even if they are not 
consistent with present habits, we have therefore 
chosen to consider some of the typical practices that 
we have observed, and try to include them in an open 
negotiation process, instead of keeping them hidden 
or informal. The practices we have chosen to test are 
described in next section.
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3.2. A negotiation process for integrating 
hidden practices into collaborative 
processes
An explanation of the practices listed in previous 
section may be that many parameters usually defined 
in the contract between customer and supplier 
heavily depend on the context and on the situation 
of each partner. For instance, the price of the parts 
(including its evolution through time) is defined 
when the contract is concluded (even if it can be re-
negotiated in some cases). It is nevertheless clear that 
the production costs depend on a precise context: for 
instance, parts produced during extra-hours are more 
expensive than if produced during normal hours. 
On the other hand, since the price is an important 
criterion for choosing a partner, accepting that he 
may change it after the contract has been concluded 
is somehow inconsistent.
Similarly, the periods of the forecast (firm, flexible 
and free) should depend on the uncertainty of the final 
demand, and not on a local context. Nevertheless, we 
have decided here to assess what would happen if the 
identified local (and sometimes “hidden”) practices 
would be included in formal negotiation processes.
As an illustration, we have chosen to focus on four 
practices often mentioned during the interviews 
(directly or indirectly):
 - the periods of the forecast. The difference 
between the length of the flexible period received 
by the customer and the one he sends to a supplier 
is a way to put pressure (shorter period) or to 
protect (longer period) the supplier. Similarly, 
sending to a supplier a firm period shorter than 
the supply cycle of his raw materials obliges the 
supplier to take risks. We suggest to generalize 
these behaviors by allowing a negotiation on the 
length of the periods of forecasts.
 - the possible load variations during the flexible 
periods of the forecasts. These variations are 
usually defined in the contracts, and can be up 
to 50% in the aeronautical sector. Nevertheless, 
high variations may be acceptable by the supplier 
in some periods, while even low ones may be 
problematic in other periods, depending on the 
global load of the supplier. Therefore, we suggest 
to adjust a possible variation through negotiation.
 - the prices and cycle times. Prices and cycle times 
are linked by the resources used, even if these two 
items are implicitly considered as independent. 
As a consequence, we suggest that the prices in a 
given situation are adjusted according to the real 
costs induced by each situation.
 - the order priority and lot sizes. Lot sizes are 
usually defined in the contracts, but their variation 
may allow to balance productivity and cycle 
time for a supplier. Similarly, suppliers have 
to sequence orders coming from their various 
customers without an objective view of their real 
criticity for each customer. We suggest that these 
two points could be discussed for a better mutual 
interest.
3.2.1. Negotiation on the periods of the forecasts
The real issue in the choice of the periods of forecast 
is risk sharing: risk taken by the supplier when he 
orders raw materials or releases production orders 
on the base of the flexible period of the forecasts he 
receives, and risk taken by the customer when he 
accepts to send to a supplier a firm period longer than 
the one he himself receives from his own customer. 
However, the interest of protective behaviors from 
the customer depends on the actual situations of the 
supplier. Therefore, we propose to put the periods of 
forecast into the middle term negotiation process, 
which would allow to make the length of the periods 
more flexible, being negotiated on the base of the real 
requirements and actual necessities of both customer 
and supplier.
The Business Process Diagram describing the 
conditions for releasing a negotiation on the periods 
of the forecasts is summarized in Figure 2, with the 
customer’s activities in the top and the supplier’s 
ones in the bottom on the figure. Using the MRP2 
method, forecasts coming from customer’s customer 
are inputs of the customer’s SOP, and then used to 
generate the MPS (Master Production Schedule) 
(point ① in Figure 2). The MPS provides more 
detailed production requirements to the MRP 
(Material Requirement Planning) calculation (point 
②). The supply plan (one of the outputs of MRP) is 
calculated using the BOM (Bill Of Materials), supply 
lead time, material inventory level, etc., according to 
the contractual horizons, including lengths of firm, 
flexible and free periods (point ③).
he supply plan is the base of the forecasts received 
by the supplier (point ④). The supplier makes then 
his own MRP calculation (point ⑤), resulting in a 
supply plan (not mentioned in Figure 2) and a load 
plan (point ⑥). Since he has taken into account his 
cycle time and the cycle time of his suppliers, the 
supplier is able to see whether this load planning is 
consistent or not, or in other terms whether he takes 
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too much risks (for instance by ordering parts on the 
base of the flexible period of forecasts, point ⑦). 
Depending on additional (and sometimes subjective) 
information on his customers and suppliers (e.g. Can 
they work faster? Do they have financial stability?), 
he decides whether these risks are acceptable or not 
(point ⑧). If he considers that he takes more risks 
than his partners (customers and suppliers), he may 
ask for negotiation (point ⑨).
The customer performs the same evaluation: he 
makes his assessment of both internal risks and 
risks he thinks the supplier takes (point ⑩). This 
assessment of course considers the horizon of the 
firm period received from his own customer, the 
horizon of the firm period he sends to his supplier, 
his internal cycle time, his supplier’s cycle time, 
etc. It should also include his opinion on additional 
information, like the cycle time from supplier’s 
suppliers, the real costs of his supplier, etc. It is clear 
that this information may be subjective or imprecise, 
since it is usually not provided by the supplier, who 
normally does not accept to communicate his real 
costs to his customer. 
The risk taken by the customer can be different for 
each of his suppliers, since two different suppliers 
do not need the same protection, or in other terms do 
not deserve that the customer takes the same risk. It 
is for instance acceptable to take risks for protecting 
a critical supplier, but not a “common” one. The 
assessment of the risk will so denote the customer’s 
vision on the allocation of risks between him and his 
suppliers. 
The next step is to decide on the acceptability of the 
risks he takes (point ⑪), by balancing the customer’s 
own strength (precisely known) and its supplier’s 
strength and weakness (supposed). This assessment 
is subjective, but is indeed implicitly done daily in 
real situations, within less formalized processes. 
If, from the customer’s vision, his risks are not 
acceptable, he will ask for a negotiation process 
(point ⑫). Otherwise, the customer will accept 
the current plans (point ⑬). After the negotiation 
process, a new agreed horizon will be integrated into 
customer’s MRP plan.
In all these cases, sharing real information instead 
of trying to guess the situation of the partner could 
facilitate to reach a consensus, but would certainly 
lead to other problems, especially linked to 
confidentiality and trust. 
The exchanges of information between actors when 
negotiation is requested by the customer have been 
modeled using an UML Sequence Diagram (OMG, 
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Figure 2. Negotiation of the periods of forecasts Figure 2. Negotiation of the periods of forecast.
2011) in Figure 3. The corresponding figures are not 
provided for the other negotiations, but bring quite 
similar information.
3.2.2. Negotiation on load variations
The second item we suggest to discuss, load 
variation, can generate problems at both customer 
and supplier’s sides. The capacity of the suppliers 
is usually limited, especially because low prices 
are poorly consistent with extra capacity, but also 
because of the present increasing workload in the 
aeronautic sector. Therefore, it is certainly dangerous 
for the customer to send an irregular load to his 
suppliers if he is himself more likely able to cope 
with variations than his suppliers. We have seen in 
previous sections that some customers try to limit the 
load variation between two consecutive periods even 
if it would be allowed by their contractual agreement. 
Nevertheless, this protective attitude is perhaps not 
always necessary since the supplier can occasionally 
be able to cope with this variation, especially if the 
price paid by the customer covers his extra costs, 
linked to a temporary increase of its capacity or to 
sub-contracting. Therefore, instead of considering 
that the supplier HAS to answer to an overload if it 
is consistent with the contract, or CANNOT answer 
to an overload (in consistence with the contract 
or not), overloads (but also lacks of loads) could 
also be negotiated, including setting into question 
the corresponding price paid by the customer.
On the customer’s side, the negotiation on load 
variation is proposed after the MRP step has been 
performed (see the top part of Figure 4). After 
integrating the forecasts in the SOP, then processing 
the MPS, the customer begins the MRP calculation 
(point ① in Figure 4). The customer may then 
consider the supply plan for each of his suppliers in 
order to identify high load variations (by comparing 
the load on the current and previous periods) (point 
②). For dealing with high load variation, the 
flexibility of the mid-term capacity of the supplier 
is essential. Therefore, the customer has to estimate 
the mid-term capacity on the supplier’s side (point 
③), as well as the costs to manage such capacity 
(point ④). As a consequence, additional information 
on the supplier’s capacity, including internal regular 
and overtime capacity, externally accessible capacity 
(through subcontracting) (point ⑤), and additional 
information on related costs (point ⑥) are important 
inputs for this estimation. Again, depending on the 
closeness of the relationship, this information can be 
known or estimated. 
Based on the estimated results, the customer needs to 
assess the feasibility of the load variation expected in 
the current period (point ⑦). From the customer’s 
vision, if the supplier is capable to manage this 
load variation, the current plan is considered as 
feasible and the MRP result is accepted (point ⑧). 
Otherwise, the customer requests for a negotiation 
process, considering as doubtful the supplier’s 
capability to perform on time delivery when facing 
the considered load variation (point ⑨). 
On the supplier’s side (bottom of Figure 4), the 
detection of capacity problems is not based on 
estimation, but on the actual capacity/load situation. 
According to the result of the load planning (point 
⑩), the supplier identifies a possible capacity 
problem (point ⑪) and checks the feasibility (point 
⑫) to address this problem (by extra hours or 
subcontracting in case of increase, by other solutions 
aiming at decreasing his capacity in the opposite 
case).
In that purpose, two important factors have to be 
taken into account: 
 - Price paid by customer (point ⑬)
 - Cost for changing capacity (point ⑭).
From the supplier’s vision, if the capacity change is 
considered as feasible, the current plans are accepted 
(point ⑮). Otherwise, the supplier will request a 
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Figure 3. Sequence of activities for periods of forecast 
negotiation (customer requested).
negotiation process and communicate his capacity 
problems to the customer (point ⑯). 
Again, the negotiation process will be triggered either 
by a customer request, a supplier request or a double 
request (not considered here). Of course, a problem 
detected by one of the partners should be validated 
by the other before negotiation. For instance, a 
customer may detect a high overload that may have 
no consequence for a supplier, if other customers of 
this supplier have decreased their orders during the 
same period. 
3.2.3. Negotiation on prices vs. cycle times
As already mentioned, urgent orders are quite usual 
in the supply and demand process of the aeronautical 
industry, even if the demand is supposed to follow 
long term programs. We distinguish this point from 
the previous one in the sense that overloads can be 
detected quite early, in the flexible period of the 
forecasts for instance, whereas urgencies have to 
be handled at short term, often in the firm period. 
Urgencies are of course firstly detected at the 
customer’s side, but the supplier is the one challenged 
through its flexibility and adjustment of capacity. 
Therefore, it can be considered as in Figure 5 that 
the problem of the cycle time for quick delivery is 
detected at the operational level of the supplier. 
Usually, the urgencies are processed by the supplier 
depending on the influence of the customer over 
him, with the result of possible disturbances on the 
short term planning propagated to other customers. 
Two cooperative behaviors could help to mitigate 
these problems: the first one would deal with the 
price, allowing the supplier to find extra capacity for 
processing the urgent parts, whereas the second one 
would deal with a better negotiation on the priorities 
between the supplier and his customers (this point is 
addressed in next section).
Concerning the first point, we shall consider here that 
the cycle time of urgent orders is partially negotiable, 
as well as their cost. When an urgent demand occurs, 
the customer should pay for the cycle time he 
expects according to the situation of his supplier; for 
instance, no increase of price would be required if 
the supplier is in an under loaded period but in other 
cases, a negotiation process on price and cycle time 
is suggested to cope with the constraints due to the 
supplier capacity.
The negotiation on price and cycle time is considered 
here for a small number of urgent orders. At the 
customer’s side, the MRP calculation is based on 
the SOP and MPS, also taking into account the 
urgent orders sent by the customer’s customer (point 
① of Figure 5), at the level consistent with their 
34 Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. Vol. 01 (2013): 27-37
Grabot, B., Ming Y., & Houé R.
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Spain
	  
 
Figure 4. Negotiation on load variation Figure 4. Negotiation on load variation.
degree of anticipation. The results of the MRP step 
provide a clear view on the changes in the material 
requirements induced by these urgent orders for the 
supplier (point ②): they may have no effects on the 
current supply plan, or urgent material orders may 
be necessary. After the load planning, the required 
due dates of the materials are confirmed (point ③), 
then the customer needs to estimate the feasibility of 
urgent orders on supplier’s side (point ④), as well 
as the possible extra cost for the supplier (point ⑤). 
According to customer’s vision, if the urgent orders 
are considered as feasible, meaning that the supplier 
is supposed to be capable to deal with such urgency, 
the current plan is accepted (point ⑥) and the urgent 
orders are sent to the supplier (point ⑦). Otherwise, 
negotiation is requested (point ⑧). 
At the supplier’s side, the urgent orders are usually 
known at the load planning or detailed scheduling 
levels (point ⑨). Based on the allocation of load/
capacity towards each customer, the supplier needs 
to check whether it is feasible to deliver the urgent 
order(s) (point ⑩) in the conditions required by the 
customer (including price) (point ⑪). If the actual 
situation allows the supplier to adjust his load/
capacity for fulfilling the urgent orders, the current 
plan is acceptable and the production process is 
launched (point ⑫). Otherwise, the supplier sends 
a request for negotiation (point ⑬), and notifies his 
customer that delivery as required is questionable in 
the present situation. 
After negotiation on the urgent orders, the new 
agreed due date will be integrated in both customer 
and supplier’s plans (point ⑭, ⑮).
3.2.4. Negotiation or priority of orders and 
lot sizes
The final item that we suggest to put into the 
negotiation process groups two operational degrees 
of freedom, namely the orders priority and lot 
sizes. From the interviews, we have seen real cases 
where SMEs try to regroup orders having common 
characteristics, usually in order to decrease the set-
up times by increasing the lot sizes (but other reasons 
may exist). Such regrouping, performed at the MRP 
level on the supplier’s side, could possibly lead to 
early or delayed orders if not done properly.
If all the orders cannot be fulfilled in time, and 
without additional information from their customers, 
it is also common that the suppliers use an internal 
priority for scheduling the orders at the operational 
level. As a consequence, tardy orders for one or 
several customers may occur. Time margins or 
safety stocks may allow the customer to face delayed 
delivery on some of the orders, but this information 
is not always shared with the suppliers.
The negotiation on orders priority and lot sizes occurs 
at the operational levels, and is mainly related to 
constraints of capacity or cost (see Figure 6). At the 
customer’s side, depending on the lot sizing policy, 
the lot size is either an input (for instance, if an 
economical lot size has been defined) (point ①) or a 
result (if a lot-for-lot policy is used) (point ②). The 
customer may in the last case need to check whether 
the supplier’s constraints on lot sizes are consistent 
with his actual requirements (point ③). If, from 
the customer’s point of view, there is no possible 
problem, the current MRP calculation is acceptable 
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Figure 5. Negotiation on Prices and Cycle times Figure 5. Negotiation on Prizes and Cycle times.
and a load planning and detailed scheduling can be 
performed (point ④, ⑤). If the customer considers 
that the current lot size is not feasible, due to the 
constraints of the supplier, a request for negotiation 
on lot size will be sent (point ⑥).
At the supplier’s side, there are two major tasks: one 
is to check the feasibility of lot sizes based on the 
results of the MRP calculation (point ⑦); the other 
is to check the respect of the due dates based on the 
load planning and detailed scheduling (point ⑧). 
If the supplier considers that increasing the contractual 
lot size could possibly lead to some benefits (point 
⑨), a request for negotiation on lot sizes can be sent 
to the customer (point ⑩). Similarly, if meeting all 
the due dates of the orders in process is not possible, 
and instead of defining internal priorities linked to the 
importance of each customer (point ⑪), the supplier 
can ask for a negotiation on the real priorities of the 
orders (point ⑩), which would allow him to define 
a schedule possibly acceptable by all the customers. 
After the negotiation process, the new agreed lot 
sizes will be integrated into the MRP calculation of 
both customer and supplier (points ⑫, ⑬), and the 
order priorities will be entered into the load planning 
and scheduling (points ⑭, ⑮). It can be noticed 
that these two negotiations are quite different from 
the previous ones, since they may involve several 
customers at the same time, and would so be certainly 
more difficult to handle in practice.
We have suggested in this section several negotiation 
processes which can be added to a classical MRP2 
process, aiming at discussing issues linked to local 
(but sometimes hidden) practices either by customers 
of suppliers of the aeronautical industry identified 
during our interviews. Because they turn some points 
included in the contracts into negotiable items, 
these practices can be considered as unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, we think that their possible interest 
should be assessed.
4. Conclusion
Despite the fact that our suggestions may seem 
to be inconsistent with common industrial habits 
(including e.g. continuous negotiation on prices and 
cycle times), the suggested negotiation processes are 
quite consistent with some practices identified during 
the industrial interviews. In any case, our goal is not 
to suggest a so-called “optimal” negotiation process, 
but to take some real empirical situations from case 
studies as examples, and try to include them into a 
consistent formal negotiation process, in order to 
check their real potential. In that purpose, numerical 
simulations are in progress in order to better identify 
the situations in which such negotiatios would be 
pertinent.
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